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What is the optimal subsidy for exercise?
Informing health insurance companies’ fitness reimbursement programs
Molly E. Frean
Advisor: Pete Ferderer

ABSTRACT: Health care costs account for 17% of US GDP and many programs and policies
seek to reduce these costs. This paper focuses on exercise as preventive care due to its immense
physiological benefits. I model the profit-maximizing choice of health insurance companies to
subsidize exercise and the utility-maximizing choice of individuals to engage in exercise using a
traditional principal-agent framework. I then use principles from behavioral economics and
psychology to critique these models and provide further insight into understanding our
underconsumption of such preventive services. I end with an evaluation of current programs and
suggestions for improvement using empirical findings.
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I. Introduction
As the healthcare industry grows and health care costs rise, there is a strong focus on
reducing health care costs, both for the societal benefits and for the increased profit for health
insurance companies. The United States Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services report that
national health expenditures reached $2.5 trillion in 2009, which translates to $8,086 per person
or 17.6 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services, 2011). This figure includes personal health care (hospital/dental care, physician and
clinical services) as well as Medicare, Medicaid, private health insurance and out-of-pocket
spending. Furthermore, estimates suggest that as much as one third of medical care does not
actually improve our health (Gruber, 2011). These healthcare expenditures, effective or not, have
been rising for many years (Figure 1) and many of these implicit costs are associated with
outcomes that can be avoided, or at the very least, alleviated through preventive care. Therefore,
it is in health insurance companies’ best interests to invest resources in programs and policies
that promote preventive behavior.
This paper focuses on one type of preventive care – exercise – and discusses how it can
be motivated through health insurance reimbursement or subsidies. The paper begins with a
discussion of the benefits of exercise, followed by a description of the traditional economic
approach to insurance. Included in this approach are two economic models – the profitmaximization choice of insurance companies to incentivize preventive care and the utilitymaximizing choice of individuals to exercise. Following the models is a description of current
fitness reimbursement programs and their encouraging results. I then provide a more critical
analysis of the problem and the current system using insights from psychology and behavioral
economics that can better help us understand the behavior as well as evaluate and improve the

2	
  

programs that are currently in place, a step not taken in the literature thus far. I end with a brief
empirical analysis of the choice to exercise, with implications for how subsidies should be
targeted and delivered.
II. Benefits of Exercise
There are many benefits of exercise, both in terms of individual health and individual
productivity. Perhaps most evident is the clear link between exercise and obesity, a growing
problem in the United States. The age-adjusted prevalence of obesity in the United States
between 2007 and 2008 was 33.8% (Flegal et al., 2010), and in 2010 no state had an obesity rate
less than 20% (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011). Obesity carries many health
risks, including increased risk of hypertension, type 2 diabetes, coronary heart disease, sleep
apnea, respiratory problems and even some cancers (Wang et al., 2008). Research has shown that
exercise not only reduces obesity but also is associated with improvements in the risk and
progression of diabetes (Manson et al., 1992, Gibala et al., 2012), cardiovascular disease and
depression (Penedo & Dahn, 2005), hypertension, osteoporosis, and cancer (Warburton et al.,
2006). If current trends in obesity continue (shown in Figure 2), total health-care costs
attributable to obesity are estimated to more than double every decade, with costs ranging from
$860 to $956 billion by 2030 (Wang et al., 2008). To put this figure in perspective, this is 17% of
total health care costs, or roughly 1 in every 6 dollars spent on health care. Any efforts to reduce
these huge increases in cost could be extremely effective in the long run.
Shephard (1999) completed a meta-analysis of work-site exercise and health programs
and showed that in addition to making employees healthier, exercise also improves worker
productivity. Employees with on-site fitness programs were between 4% and 5% more
productive than those without. Furthermore, those employers with such programs in place
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experienced a cumulative benefit of $500 to $700 per worker per year for physical activity and
aerobic fitness. Exercise, along with regular religious practice, also appears to have a positive
impact on general well-being or happiness (Mochon, Norton & Ariely, 2007) – arguably reason
enough for regular physical activity, let alone the immense physiological benefits.
There is also substantial research on and public attention given to other benefits of
exercise – with many academic studies on these benefits being publicized in large newspapers
like The New York Times. In the past year alone, the following studies have received great
media attention. Head et al. (2012) found that daily physical activity such as a walk or a jog
reduces both the risk of developing Alzheimer’s and also has the potential to change the course
of the disease should it develop. Another study underscores the importance of staying active by
showing that exercise is crucial in the human body’s method of removing garbage or waste from
inside its cells, a process called autophagy (He et al., 2012). Matsui et al. (2011) used rats to
study how the brain fuels itself during exercise and showed that prolonged exercise significantly
lowers the brain’s stores of energy, particularly in the frontal cortex and the hippocampus – areas
involved in thinking and memory. A follow-up study showed that after exercise, a period of rest
and eating restores brain levels of glycogen (a substance used for energy) as much as 60 percent
above original levels (pre-exercise) in the frontal cortex and hippocampus – a sort of
overcompensation for the loss experienced during exercise (Matsui et al., 2012). Further, they
found that for continued exercise, the overcompensation level became the new normal level, with
baseline levels of glycogen showing significant increases compared to sedentary subjects. This
prolonged rise in fuel reserves has tremendous implications for not only the brain’s ability to
sustain and direct movement, but also for sharper cognitive function given the associated areas.
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Despite these benefits being widely acknowledged and often even understood, many
people still have trouble getting themselves to the gym or even outside for a short run or bout of
physical activity. The following section outlines current fitness incentive programs offered by
health insurance companies in the US (as well as other exercise initiatives) that try to capitalize
on these immense gains to exercise.
III. Current Fitness Incentive Programs
Many incentive schemes like the one modeled above exist today, with some health
insurance companies already publishing encouraging results. Table 1 displays the top 10 health
insurance companies in the US (according to US News & World Report) and the different fitness
incentive programs they offer. Some programs include only educational resources and
information, but many also offer monetary discounts or reimbursement for fitness memberships.
Insurance companies throughout the US, the top-10 and others, offer a variety of programs aimed
at motivating and incentivizing fitness. Tufts Health Plan’s “Fitness Rewards” and Blue Cross
Blue Shield of Massachusetts’ “Fitness Benefit” programs offer members up to $150 back on
fitness center membership only once they have been members of a fitness center for at least four
months. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care and Harvard Pilgrim Health Care of New England offer
similar reimbursement schemes to members. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Minnesota offers
members up to $20 off of monthly health club membership fees if they meet attendance goals
(typically 8-10 visits per month) and Connecticare of Connecticut also offers members
discounted monthly membership fees. The structure of these reimbursement programs is
typically retroactive; members submit a form to the health insurance provider with evidence of
fitness membership payment/attendance. Should they meet the stipulations of the program, they
are then reimbursed accordingly.
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With such reimbursement programs in place, it is important that the cost to the health
insurance companies is offset by the health benefits (from the increase in exercise behavior) of
members and the reduced medical costs paid by the insurance company. There is little publicized
research in this domain; however, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Minnesota (2007) conducted a
yearlong study of 74,000 members participating in their “Fitness Discounts” program. They
found that frequent users (defined as using a fitness center at least eight times per month) had
claim costs 17.8% lower than non-participants after adjusting for health history, as well as
emergency room visit rates and hospital admission rates 38.7% and 41.4% lower than nonparticipants, respectively. Their study also showed that the more workouts, the better. Frequent
users had claim costs 9.8% lower than low users (defined as those who used a fitness center for
fewer than eight times a month). Similarly, frequent user emergency room visit rates and hospital
admission rates are 41.8% and 45.2% lower than low users. As of March 2007, roughly 90,000
BCBS of MN members were enrolled in the program, representing about 10% of those eligible.
Medica (2007) performed a similar analysis of members enrolled in their “Fit Choices”
program who met the threshold for reimbursement of eight visits to a gym per month. Those who
met the threshold had significantly lower costs for prescriptions, doctor appointments, and care
at clinics and hospitals. The average monthly medical costs of these enrollees were 33.6% lower
than those in a matched control group. These people also reported improvements not only
regarding weight loss, but also in levels of energy and stress. People not enrolled in the “Fit
Choices” program and who did not exercise eight times a month were 43%-105% more likely to
have been to a clinic, hospital, or emergency room.
While the BCBSMN and Medica studies do not have the benefit of inferring cause that
can be isolated using randomized controlled field studies, and are likely prone to selection bias,
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both studies are nonetheless suggestive and encouraging. Though it is likely that many members
enrolled in such programs would exercise anyway, the programs likely still have the power to
incentivize motivation for some who would not be engaging in physical activity otherwise. At
the very least, their results clearly show the link between exercise and lower health-care costs.
There is certainly cause for further research on the influence of such programs on physical
activity and on their ultimate effectiveness in reducing claims costs, affecting the health
insurance company’s bottom line.
Research on the impact of incentives on exercise in other contexts is also encouraging.
Charness and Gneezy (2009) carried out a study looking at the motivating effect of different
monetary incentives to exercise. As part of the study, they compare the behaviors of participants
randomized into three groups. All groups were given a handout on the benefits of exercise. One
group was not given anything else (no incentive group). Participants in another group were
additionally paid $25 to attend a gym once in a given week (low-incentive group) and
participants in the other group were given the $25 incentive as well as $100 if they attended the
gym eight more times in the following four weeks (high-incentive group). After observing
attendance before, during and for a period of seven weeks after the end of the intervention, their
main finding was that post-intervention attendance was more than twice as high for the highincentive group than for the no-incentive group (0.56 visits per week compared to 1.24 visits per
week). Furthermore, the difference did not decline at all during the time following payment,
suggesting that their high-incentive scheme was successful in inducing posit habit formation.
While the study shows that the dollar amount matters, the exact relationship between payment
and amount exercised and whether or not it is continuous or incremental in nature, is not clear.
These results have potential implications for the amount of reimbursement health insurance
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companies provide – too little could not have the desired effect to truly reduce cost and too much
could be unnecessary (and in other words, a waste for the health insurance company).
It is evident that there is substantial variation in past and current approaches to motivating
exercise habits. In an effort to understand and explain this variation, the following sections take a
theoretical approach to the firm’s choice to subsidize exercise and the individual’s choice to
exercise. The theoretical portion begins with a discussion of the traditional economic explanation
of why people often remain sedentary and underinvest in beneficial measures of preventive care
like exercise.
IV. Traditional Economics of Insurance
1. Overview
The economic principle of moral hazard is crucial in understanding the dynamics
between health insurance companies and their customers. Consideration of this phenomenon
lends itself to understanding why many people seemingly do not act in their own self-interest and
behave in a way that is contrary to what is best for their health.
Moral hazard is the term used to describe a lack of motivation to guard against risk when
one is protected or insulated from the risk’s consequences (Hölmstrom, 1979). Moral hazard is
characterized by a situation where an individual makes a decision that is of higher risk, knowing
another party will cover the cost, compared to the decision he would make if he were fully
exposed to the risk. Moral hazard occurs in insurance markets because the behavior of the
insured is affected by the insurance itself and the insured person’s actions affect the insurer’s
costs. This is likely the reason why many individuals consume suboptimal levels of preventive
care. For example, if someone has health insurance and chooses to not get immunized against a
certain disease and then contracts it, the health insurance company bears the significant burden
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of the financial cost of the disease. There is therefore little incentive for the individual to obtain
the immunization. Another example may be engaging in poor dietary habits because the costs of
ensuing problems like heart disease will be covered. The same intuition applies for exercise as a
preventive action – many individuals see it as costly to exercise in the short run so they choose
not to, and the cost of this lack of physical activity is shifted to the health insurer in the long run.
This problem of moral hazard leads to a classical principal-agent problem where the principal
(the insurer) attempts to alter the behavior of the agent (the insured) through an incentive
scheme, described later on.
An agent is anyone that is employed or managed by a principal and whose actions affect
the principal. A principal-agent problem arises when agents pursue their own goals rather than
the goals of principals. This problem is often discussed in the context of a business – it is costly
for managers to oversee and monitor their workers. This leads to employees pursuing their own
interests by shirking or engaging in other activities that reduce the firm’s profitability. Firms
often respond to this principal-agent problem by offering bonuses, piece-rates or other
performance incentives to better align the goals of their employees with those of the firm.
This problem applies to insured parties as agents and the insurance companies as
principals. Moral hazard arises because insured parties have less incentive to guard against risks,
since they are protected from their consequences by the insurance. For example, a health
insurance company lowers the cost to the insured of engaging in an unhealthy lifestyle because
future hospital bills will be paid for by the insurance company. With this lower cost, individuals
are more likely pursue a less healthy lifestyle, which raises the future costs of the insurance
company that is insuring them.
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In addition to moral hazard, our tendency to discount the future is also likely affecting
our choices not to exercise. Put simply, discounting is the tendency of people to decrease the
present value of rewards as they occur further and further into the future. For example, one
values $100 obtained today more than the promise of $100 obtained tomorrow, and one values
$100 tomorrow more than $100 the next day.
The notion that discount rates are consistent over time is referred to as exponential
discounting, and is represented by the following equation, where 0 < δ < 1 is the discount rate
and δ = 1 implies no discounting:
D(t) = δ t = 1,δ ,δ 2 ,δ 3 ,...

(1.1)

This gives rise to the following equation for overall utility at time t, Ut, where ut represents the
€

per-period utility occurring in future periods:

U t = ut + δut +1 + δ 2 ut +2 + δ 3 ut +3 + ...

(1.2)

As shown in Eqs. (1.1) and (1.2), exponential discounting asserts that the marginal rate of
substitution between€consumption at any two points in time depends exclusively on the distance
between the two points. In other words, the value of a given reward decays by the same
proportion for each time period (day, month, year) that the reward’s occurrence is delayed. For
example, if δ = 0.5 and exercise lowers Ut by 1 and raises Ut+1 by 1.5, the individual will not
choose to exercise even though |ΔUt| < |ΔUt+1| because |ΔUt| > δ |ΔUt+1|. Because the rewards of
exercise often occur in the future, they are discounted by the individual and therefore less weight
is placed on potential benefits when an individual makes a decision to or not to exercise.
To combat both moral hazard and exponential discounting, health insurance companies
pursue policies and programs like those outlined in the previous section. The incentive scheme of
reimbursement can be modeled using the following traditional framework.
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2. Theory: Health Insurer Decision
The following model is an adaption of that proposed by Pauly (1990). Consider the
population of members insured by a health insurance company, N. Each individual in population
N has two possible future states of health, H1 or H2. In H1, the insurance company’s medical
expenditures on the individual, E, are zero because he does not incur any illness. In H2, however,
the individual contracts an illness and medical expenditures on the individual are E > 0. A
prevention service that reduces the risk of illness, in this case exercise or fitness, F, is available
in the current period at a membership fee, P. If the prevention service is not consumed in the
current period, the probability of state H2 occurring is pN. However, if the service is consumed,
the probability of state H2 occurring is pY, where pY < pN. From the insurance company’s point of
view, entire coverage of fitness is cost effective if the following condition holds:
( pN − pY )⋅ E > PF

(2.1)

In other words, if fitness lowers the expected future medical costs by more than the membership
€
fee, the service is cost-effective.

Insurance companies can also choose to cover or reimburse only a fraction of fitness
membership fees. Let K be the fraction of fitness membership fee (P) that is covered by
insurance. In other words, K is the percentage of P that is paid by the health insurance company.
If K = 1, the insurance company covers the entire price of the membership fee. If K = 0.25, the
insurance company covers 25% of the membership fee, and so on. Because demand is a function
of price and K effectively lowers the price of fitness memberships, demand for fitness
memberships can thus be characterized by the following, where N is size of the total population:
D1 = f (K)

(2.2)

D2 = N − D1

(2.3)

€
€
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Above, D1 refers to the subset of the population that consumes a fitness membership (F), given a
certain level of K, while D2 refers to the remainder of the population that does not consume F.
The partial derivatives of the demand equations with respect to K are shown below, with
their expected signs:

€

dD1
>0
dK

(2.4)

dD2
<0
dK

(2.5)

That is, for an increase in K (more coverage), D1 is expected to rise, while D2 is expected to fall.

€
The health insurance company’s
total cost is dependent on both the reimbursement cost
and the cost of illness and can be modeled by the following:

θ T = (D1 ⋅ K⋅ P) + E(D1 ⋅ pY + D2 ⋅ pN )

(2.6)

In the above equation, the left term on the right hand side, (D1⋅K⋅P), refers to current period costs
€
– it is the product of the price the health insurance company pays for each membership (K⋅P),

and the quantity of memberships consumed, D1. The right term on the right hand side shows
future costs. Specifically, each group (D1 and D2) poses a different expected cost to the health
insurance company in the future, characterized by the two groups’ differing probabilities of
contracting an illness. The quantity in parentheses is thus the quantity of members expected to
contract the illness and it is multiplied by the medical expenditure per individual with that
illness, E. If the health insurance company chooses to set K > 0, and cover a certain portion of
the fitness membership price, P, current expenses increase but future expenses fall.
I use this conceptualization by Pauly (1990) to model the change in costs induced by
changes in K. This is done by taking the partial derivative of Eq. (2.6) with respect to K, which
yields the following equation:
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dθ
dD1
dD1
dD2 dD1
= P(D1 + K⋅
) + E ( pY ⋅
+ pN ⋅
⋅
)
dK
dK
dK
dD1 dK

(2.7)

Eq. (2.7) simplifies to the following, because we know the partial derivative of D2 with respect to
€
D1 :

dθ
dD
dD
= P(D1 + K⋅ 1 ) + E 1 ( pY − pN )
dK
dK
dK

(2.8)

Thus, the change in total costs is made up of an increase in current costs for the reimbursement
and a decrease in the€expected future costs due to more members consuming F (and a higher D1)
with the higher reimbursement amount. Specifically, the left term on the right hand side of Eq.
(2.8) is positive, because the partial derivative of D1 with respect to K is positive. The right term
on the right hand side of Eq. (2.8) is negative because the positive partial derivative (dD1/dK) is
positive and the quantity (pY – pN) is negative.
To minimize costs, the health insurance company maximizes profit by setting the optimal
level of K. This occurs when Eq. (2.8) is equal to zero and can be characterized by:
K* =

E
D
( pN − pY ) − 1
P
ϕ

where ϕ =

dD1
dK

(2.9)

According to Eq. (2.9), the larger the differential between pN and pY, the greater the

€– the subsidy should be greater the more
subsidy (K) should€be. This intuitively makes sense
beneficial the preventive service (fitness) is for one’s health. The direct relationship between E
and K also makes sense – the greater the medical expense to the insurer, the higher the subsidy
should be. The term ϕ refers to how responsive members are to changes in K. Such knowledge
has implications for how health insurance companies set K in their efforts to minimize costs and
maximize profit in the long run. If consumers are very responsive to changes in K, rises in K will
be associated with significantly greater reductions in future expected costs. However, if

13	
  

consumers are less sensitive to changes in K, it may not be in the health insurance company’s
best interest to adjust K because reductions in future costs may not offset the expenditure used in
reimbursement.
If firms like health insurance companies are susceptible to the same discounting
tendencies as individuals, the exponential discount rate, δ, would affect the medical expenditure
variable, E, because it is a future cost. This changes the equation for the optimal K to the
following:
K* =

δ⋅ E
D
( pN − pY ) − 1
P
ϕ

(2.10)

With discounting behavior, the optimal K is directly related to the discount rate. As firms
€
discount the future more and δ falls, the optimal level of K also falls because firms weigh and

care about the future medical cost relatively less. Conversely, as firms care more about the future
and δ increases, the optimal level of K rises and the forward-looking nature of the firm is in a
sense transferred to the individual being subsidized. The following section models the individual
choice to exercise or be a part of D1, given the level of K set by his/her health insurance
company.
3. Theory: Consumer Decision
The previous model presented the equation characterizing the optimal level of the subsidy
for exercise, K*. Included in the equation is the relationship between changes in K and individual
member behavior in consuming F (to be a part of D1). To better understand how this decision is
made, it is important to understand how consumption of services like F and others affect a given
individual’s lifetime utility function. For the following model, I use the conceptualization of
utility given by Newhouse (2006): utility at time t is characterized by the following condition:
U t = U(X t ,H t (m, X))

€

(3.1)
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In the above equation, X refers to non-medical goods and services consumed and H refers to a
stock of health, which is dependent on both consumption of X and a stock of medical care, m
(from consumption of medical goods and services). Both m and X are not subscripted to indicate
that health depends on prior period consumption.
In the case of this paper, I posit that exercise, or fitness (F) affects m in that it is a
preventive medical service. In a two-period model, lifetime utility is characterized by:
U = U[X1,H1 (m1 (1,F1 ), X1 ), X 2 ,H 2 (m1 (1,F1 ),m2 (m1 (1,F1 ),F2 ), X1, X 2 )]

(3.2)

I also assume that the individual faces a budget constraint where lifetime income, I, is
spent €
entirely on X and F in each period, priced as PX1,X2 and PF1,F2, respectively:

I = ((1 − K1)⋅ PF1 ⋅ F1 ) + ((1 − K 2 )⋅ PF2 ⋅ F2 ) + (PX 1 ⋅ X1) + (PX 2 ⋅ X 2 )

(3.3)

The individual chooses or plans levels of X1, X2, F1 and F2 in the first period and maximizes
utility€in Eq. (3.2) subject to (Eq. 3.3). This maximization is characterized by the following
Lagrangian:

Φ = U(X1, X 2 ,H1,H 2 ) − λ[((1 − K1 )⋅ PF1 ⋅ F1 ) + ((1 − K 2 )⋅ PF2 ⋅ F2 ) + (PX 1 ⋅ X1 ) + (PX 2 ⋅ X 2 )] (3.4)
This maximization yields first-order conditions in Eqs. (3.5), displayed in Table 2. It is important

€ to note the multitude of elements that affect each marginal utility. For example, note the lasting
effect of goods consumed in the first period on future period health, and thus utility. Simplified
versions of the first-order conditions, after setting them equal to zero – Eqs. (3.6) – are displayed
in Table 3.
Combining several of the first order conditions yields the following two equations,
representing the tradeoff between X and F within each period:

MU X 1
MU F1

€

=

PX 1
(1 − K1 )⋅ PF1

(3.7)
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MU X 2

=

MU F2

PX 2

(3.8)

(1 − K 2 )⋅ PF2

The above equations show that within each period, the marginal utility the individual derives
from both X and F is related€to the value of K. For an increase in K in either period, the price
ratio increases and to maintain equilibrium, either MUX must increase or MUF must fall – this
occurs when consumption of F increases and/or X decreases. Intuitively, this makes sense
because an increase in K is effectively lowering the price of F, leading to increased consumption.
The first order conditions can also be combined to show the between period trade-offs of
consuming X and F.

MU X 1
MU X 2
MU F1

€

MU F2

=

=

PX 1

(3.9)

PX 2

(1 − K1 )⋅ PF1
(1 − K 2 )⋅ PF2

(3.10)

The relationship in Eq. (3.10) shows that the marginal utility the individual derives from

€
fitness in each period is related
to the health insurance company’s choice of K in each period.
This is because the individual derives marginal utility from the quantities of F1 and F2 consumed,
which in turn depend on the values of K. For example, an increase in K1 decreases the value of
the price ratio in Eq. (3.10), and to maintain equilibrium, it follows that MUF1 must fall and/or
MUF2 must rise. Because marginal utility of F1 falls as consumption of F1 increases (and the
converse for F2), the ultimate result of an increase in K1 must be an increase in F1 and/or a
decrease in F2. In this case, an increase in K1 is analogous to the introduction of a subsidy for
exercise. Similarly, an increase in K2 increases the value of the price ratio, and now MUF1 must
rise and/or MUF2 must fall, or, consumption of F1 must fall and/or consumption of F2 must rise.
It is also possible to create comparative statics from the first order conditions that show
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substitution between F in one period and X in the other due to the planning nature of the model.
For example, the consumer may choose to substitute towards F1 at not only at the expense of X1
but also/instead at the expense of X2.
Thus far I have assumed no discounting on the part of the member when weighing
second-period utility. However, since we know that individuals do discount the future and its
benefits, it is important to observe how the previous analysis changes when discount rates are
introduced.
Using a model of traditional exponential discounting, where individuals discount or
weigh future outcomes with a constant discount rate δ, lifetime utility can be characterized by:
n

U t = ∑δ i ut +1

(3.11)

i=0

Translated into the two-period model of this paper, lifetime utility is then characterized

€

by the following expression:

U = u[X1,H1,(m1, X1)] + δ ⋅ u[X 2,H 2 (m1,m2, X1, X 2 )]

(3.12)

Conceptually, this yields first order conditions such that the marginal utility of anything in the
future (H2 or X€
2) is discounted by δ, and worth less to the individual at time 1, when decisions
are made. This gives rise to a new set of ratios representing utility maximization between
periods, shown below:

MU X 1

δ ⋅ MU X 2
MU F1
€

δ ⋅ MU F2

=

=

PX 1
PX 2

(1 − K1 )⋅ PF1
(1 − K 2 )⋅ PF2

(3.13)

(3.14)

The same interpretation of Eq. (3.10) holds for Eq. (3.14), however, the marginal utility

€ traditional exponential discount rate, δ, which affects all future
of F2 is now modified by the
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periods. Relative to the previous case where δ =1, the same increase in K1 means that MUF1 must
be relatively lower and/or MUF2 must be relatively higher. That is, the individual must increase
consumption of F1 or decrease consumption of F2. This makes sense intuitively because
discounting of future benefits of exercise (MUF2) would lead the consumer to plan to consume
less of F2. The next section provides a more critical look at this choice to exercise and the
associated incentive programs, using a behavioral economic and psychological perspective.
V. Insights from Psychology & Behavioral Economics
While the previous two models are useful in understanding the individual choice to
exercise, and the health insurance company’s attempt to influence that choice, both models do
not capture the entire reality of the problem. Insights from both behavioral economics and
psychology can help to further explain and understand the apparent underconsumption of clearly
beneficial activities. Furthermore, this additional perspective improves our ability to evaluate the
relative potential effectiveness of current programs or policies aimed at solving the problem and
suggest improvements.
Understanding the Problem
Contrary to traditional beliefs about exponential discounting, research has shown that
exponential discounting is not actually as common as one might believe, and in fact, people often
hyperbolically discount, and place additional weight on the present (Laibson, 1997). In
hyperbolic discounting, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is not exclusively
dependent on the distance between two consumptions points in time. A situation of exponential
discounting posits that if I prefer $100 today to $110 tomorrow, then I would also prefer $100 a
year from now to $110 a year and one day from now, but when given this choice, many would be
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willing to wait the additional day to receive $110 a year from now, suggesting that discount rates
are not constant over time.
A comparison between traditional exponential discounting rates and hyperbolic
discounting rates over time is shown in Figure 3. There are two key differences in the features of
the curves. In the hyperbolic function, there is a steep initial drop off point showing present-bias
and the immediate higher discounting of future rewards. The hyperbolic function also becomes
flatter than the exponential function, showing that delayed rewards are less discounted in
hyperbolic models than in exponential models.
Hyperbolic discounting would be observed with exercise in that the trade-off rates between
today and the metaphorical tomorrow are different than the trade-off rates between tomorrow
and the next day. This difference often leads to preference reversals or a situation of dynamic
inconsistency, the term given to the situation that arises when a decision-maker’s preferences
change over time (Bénabou, 2002). This can be easily understood by thinking of decision-makers
as consisting of many selves over time – a today self, a tomorrow self, etc – that do not hold
aligned preferences. For example, in the evening before bed, one may decide to set an alarm for
6:00 am but come the morning, the person actually prefers an extra hour of sleep and wakes up at
7:00 am. The same logic can be used to explain the procrastination of exercise – a person may
decide on Friday to exercise on Monday, but come Monday, the person’s preferences have
changed and exercising is no longer a top priority.
In contrast to the standard model of exponential discounting, hyperbolic discounting
makes overall utility at time t, Ut, equivalent to:

or

U t = ut + βδut +1 + βδ 2 ut +2 + βδ 3 ut +3 + ...

(5.1)

U t = ut + β(δut +1 + δ 2 ut +2 + δ 3 ut +3 + ...)

(5.2)

€
€
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Above, δ is the standard exponential discounting rate, and β is the hyperbolic discount rate,
which represents our tendency to overvalue the present and uniformly discount all future periods,
DellaVigna (2009) uses the following (β,δ) model to illustrate the case of preference
reversal and self-control problems that occur with exercise. Consider three time periods, denoted
t0, t1 and t2. In the first and second periods, the decision maker or agent is a “planner” and
“doer”, respectively. Exercise is a good with both an immediate cost (b1, which is negative),
incurred in the second period (t1), and a future benefit (b2), experienced in the third period (t2).
From an ex ante perspective, the planner will plan to exercise at t1 if βδb1 + βδ2b2 > 0, or:
b1 + δb2 ≥ 0

(5.3)

Above, β cancels out because all payoffs are in the future. However, when the time comes to
€ only if this new condition holds:
exercise, the agent actually does so
b1 + βδb2 ≥ 0

(5.4)

Note here that β applies to the second term on the left-hand side because it is occurring in
€
the future, but not the first because the present is now t1. For certain values of b1, b2, β and δ, the

agent will plan to exercise but choose not to when the time comes. For example, if b1 = -6, b2 =
8, β = ½ and δ = 1, the agent plans to exercise because Eq. (5.3) is positive, but ultimately does
not exercise because Eq. (5.4) is negative. This preference reversal occurs because when the time
comes to exercise, the future benefit is discounted by the hyperbolic discount rate β and the
relatively more salient current costs overpower the future benefit.
Consistent with the example above, Leibman and Zeckhauser (2008) explain that this
behavior is common, where many people tend to underinvest in preventive measures like
exercise due to overweighting of current-period costs and underweighting of future-period
benefits. Such is the nature of exercise – though there are several short-term or immediate
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benefits of exercise (for example, heightened energy), many of the benefits are experienced later
and are not salient at the time the action occurs. Therefore, in addition to mitigating the moral
hazard and exponential discounting problems, subsidizing the costs associated with preventive
care helps to overcome the underconsumption of such care by people who act under the
inefficient conditions of dynamic inconsistency. In essence, subsidies like those in fitness
reimbursement schemes operate to decrease our assessment of the immediate cost of exercise, b1,
leading us to choose to exercise as a “doer”, not only as a planner.
It is worthwhile, also, to consider the discounting behavior on the part of the health insurer
in more detail. If consumers act under conditions like hyperbolic discounting, leading to
preference reversals, it follows that firms may do the same and in addition to exponential
discounting, also fall victim to present-biased decisions. However, an argument can be made that
firms are less prone to these biases due to their scale, organization, experience and exposure to
competition. In his book The Visible Hand, Alfred Chandler (1977) explains the emergence of
the managerial structure of firms and highlights the fact that managers prefer policies that are
geared towards long-term stability and growth to policies that solely maximize current profits.
Chandler (1990) goes into greater depth describing the organization of modern businesses,
explaining that the modern industrial firm is defined as “a collection of operating units, each with
its own specific facilities and personnel, whose combined resources and activities are
coordinated, monitored, and allocated by a hierarchy of middle and top managers.” In many
firms, one of these units specializes in long-term thinking and carries out activities such as
research and development, hiring consultants and analysis of large data sets (e.g. data on past
experience). Such specialization leads to efficient resource utilization and reductions in costs.
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The fact that firms are subject to competition also serves to reduce the incidence of
present-bias, as those firms that are less rational are less likely to survive – firms that are
predominantly forward-looking ultimately outcompete those who only focus on the present.
Even if firms were to have nonstandard features, they still have the incentive to respond to the
nonstandard features of consumers – the principal-agent framework is not escapable and it will
always be in a firm’s best interest to pursue policies or programs that mitigate the problem.
Evaluating Health Behavior Change Programs/Policies
In efforts to predict and evaluate the relative effectiveness of various behavior-change
policies, there should be consideration of how certain programs influence the decision-making
process and what they assume to be the underlying factor driving the problem. The designs of the
various interventions that exist today suggest what the insurer hypothesizes as to the cause of the
problem. Educational modules, pamphlets and online tutorials aim suggest that our failure to
exercise at optimal levels is at least in part due to a lack of information. For some individuals, it
may be sufficient to provide them with a brochure on the long-term benefits to incite behavior
change. For others, however, the problem comes down to more than simple lack of knowledge or
misunderstanding of the advantages of regular physical activity. Programs that offer monetary
incentives, however, acknowledge that there is more to the problem than just a deficiency of
information. Health insurers and employers incentivize people financially because they
understand that humans often require the additional nudge to change behavior.
In the three-period (β,δ) model, it is possible that educational approaches operate to
exclusively increase b2, while financial incentives like monthly reimbursement serve to reduce
current period valuations of the costs of exercise, making b1 less negative. This idea will be
further explored in Section V. Because discount rates are so powerful, it may be that investing in
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and developing programs or policies with rewards that cannot be discounted are more likely to
change behavior. These will be programs that affect our perception and valuation of immediate
rewards versus delayed rewards. In fact, research has shown that in the human brain, separate
neural systems evaluate the two types of rewards (McClure et al., 2004). This shows that we
think about them differently and arguably therefore modify our behavior based on them
differently. While there is some worry that offering extrinsic incentives can undermine intrinsic
interest (Lepper, Greene and Nisbett, 1973), it is also possible that extrinsic incentives can be
used effectively to change behavior, particularly when the level of initial intrinsic interest in the
activity is low and when the activity is one whose attractiveness becomes apparent after
engaging in it for a prolonged period of time. Marteau, Ashcroft, and Oliver (2009) share this
view, explaining “offering a reward can help people to align their actions more closely with their
true preferences. From such a perspective, incentives operate to enhance rather than to restrict
autonomy.”
Ariely and Norton (2008) explain that actions can also often create, not just reveal,
preferences. They argue that a person’s actions are determined not only by the hedonic utility of
those options but also of their memories for past actions that have been influenced by random
situational factors. These memories then shape future utilities and thus future actions. In the case
of physical activity, exercising in the context of an incentive or in another type of random
positive environment may lead to the creation of a preference for the activity that the individual
views as reflective of his or her stable preferences. A similar phenomenon is the “learning-bydoing” concept in economic theory where workers are able to improve their productivity through
repetition of a given action (Hall and Rosenberg, 2010).
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Furthermore, psychological literature on positive addiction suggests that once certain
behaviors are undertaken, people can become addicted to their positive psychological effects, a
phenomenon pioneered and first described by Glasser (1976). He explains that a positive
addiction is an activity that increases one’s mental strength and when missed results in some
kind of misery, pain, or upset (psychological or physical). The activity causes a pleasurable,
sometimes even euphoric mental state, which he describes as trancelike and transcendental. He
writes that running, and other types of exercise, as well as meditation, are particularly amenable
to this phenomenon. Specifically, he outlines six criteria for a positive addiction: (1) it is
something noncompetitive that you choose to do and you can devote an hour (approximately) a
day to it; (2) it is possible for you to do it easily and it does not take a great deal of mental effort
to do it well; (3) you can do it alone or rarely with others but it does not depend upon others to
do it; (4) you believe that it has some value (physical, mental, or spiritual) for you; (5) you
believe that if you persist at it you will improve, but this is completely subjective – you need to
be the only one who measures that improvement; (6) the activity must have the quality that you
can do it without criticizing yourself. Glasser also points out that addiction to exercise or running
does not come quickly, with many runners needing to build enough endurance so that they can
run effortlessly before they truly reap the mental effects. Such is likely another reason why
humans have difficulty starting and maintaining regular exercise routines – the short-term
benefits are ironically not necessarily immediately available and the long-term benefits are
discounted and therefore not as salient as current costs.
More recent evidence on running/exercise addiction has confirmed Glasser’s position.
Perkins (1988) studied 100 runners, 99% of which reported feeling a positive addicted state,
described as a transcendental, trance-like state that was characterized by free mental relaxation
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and euphoria. Furthermore, 98% of the runners explained that they experience discomfort when a
planned run is missed. Griffiths (1997) attempted to explain the positive addiction to running
with an endorphin hypothesis, suggesting that the addiction is a result of “endogenous
morphines” or endorphins that are produced with exercise, that lead to an enhanced mood. Leedy
(2009) conducted a qualitative study of long-distance running in women and found that all
women used running as a way to cope with emotional stress, supporting the idea that exercise
and running lead to better mood states. Cox and Orford (2004) found similar results after
interviewing avid exercisers – participants in the study reported both short-term (a ‘buzz’,
feelings of enjoyment and satisfaction, and improved mood) and long-term (improved health,
fitness, confidence and general well-being) payoffs to exercise that jointly affected their habits or
addiction to the behavior. Many studies have also looked into negative exercise addiction or
exercise dependence, suggesting that there is a fine line between the aforementioned positive
addictive aspect of exercise and the negative dependent nature that some individuals experience
that ends up being detrimental to their health (Smijewski & Howard, 2003; Allegre et al., 2006;
MacLaren & Best, 2007; Adams, 2009).
Improving Health Behavior Change Programs/Policies
Given the aforementioned phenomena and research, it is evident that current policies and
programs could be improved. It could be that people need only be incentivized to or reimbursed
for exercise for a limited period of time, just enough to allow for the habit to develop and for
individuals to feel to develop a true preference or feel positively addicted. In an ideal world, each
individual would only be reimbursed for the length of time it takes for the habit to develop and
the individual to engage in the behavior with or without incentives in place. While ideal, it is not
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realistically feasible due to the great variation that exists among people in developing habits and
the difficulty that would come with implementing such a complicated system of rewards.
It is also worthwhile to consider alternate means for the health insurance company to
monitor or track people’s behavior. Using the quantity of visits to the gym does not guarantee
that the time is spent effectively or in some cases spent at all. It may be beneficial for insurers to
move towards more biometric measures of fitness and reward individuals based on weight-loss
or cardiac fitness. This would allow them to have a more accurate assessment of how the fitness
or exercise is affecting their members’ health and would arguably increase the salience of the
benefits of exercise for members. For example, one may begin to see more value in exercising if
he/she can and must observe how his/her heart rate or BMI is changing over time. Again,
however, this could be costly and not very practical. A potential compromise could be to use a
system where people are rewarded in a point accumulation system where points are assigned
based on time spent exercising or machines/facilities used. The following section revisits the
individual choice to exercise, taking an empirical approach to the assessment of the costs and
benefits of exercise as described in the (β, δ) hyperbolic discounting model.
VI. Empirics
1. Design
In order to further investigate my hypothesis as to the differential influence of incentive
programs versus more educational/informative interventions on individual assessments of the
cost and benefit, I conducted the following empirical study. I used a between-subjects design
where 194 participants aged 13-85 completed a survey that asked them to assess the cost of a
given exercise routine (b1) as well as their valuation of the benefits of the routine (b2). The
exercise routine was given as exercising for at least one hour, two times per week for three
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months. Before answering the cost and benefit questions, participants were primed to one of
three conditions (two experimental and one control). The first experimental condition consisted
of a monetary incentive prime in which participants were instructed to imagine they were
enrolled in an incentive program that rewarded them with a cash subsidy for exercising each
month. Specifically, the prime read:
While completing this survey, please imagine that you're in the following situation: You have just
enrolled in a fitness benefits program via your Health Insurance Company that will indefinitely
reward you for exercising regularly. According to the plan, your Health Insurance Company will
pay $20 of your monthly gym membership If you attend the health club 8 or more times in that
month (roughly two visits per week). If you meet or exceed attendance goals, you will receive
this reimbursement via a check at the end of each month.

The second experimental prime was educational in nature – participants were instructed to read
an abridged version (see Appendix) of a report published by the Mayo Clinic (2011) on the
benefits of physical activity. For the control condition, subjects were primed with a neutral
prime, which discussed the tenants of the Affordable Care Act proposed by the current President,
Barack Obama (see Appendix). After priming, each subject was asked to recall and summarize
what he or she had received in the prime part of the survey. Participants that failed to complete
this portion of the survey were excluded from analysis.
The next part of the survey consisted of three questions. The first question asked
participants how they would value the cost (financial and non-financial) of the exercise routine
(b1), the second asked participants how large of a benefit they would expect from the routine, and
the third question asked participants how much they would value this benefit (b2). All answers
were restricted to multiple-choice on a Likert scale from 1-10 where higher numbers signify
greater cost or greater benefit. The final portion of the survey asked participants to answer a set
of demographic questions including sex, age, educational status and employment status.
Participants were also asked to provide information on their current exercise habits and on their
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perceptions of their current weight and level of fitness. Data was collected with SurveyMonkey
and analyzed using SPSS Statistical Software.
2. Results
To test the hypotheses that an incentive scheme reduces an individual’s evaluation of the
current-period cost of exercise and an educational intervention increases an individual’s
evaluation of future benefits, mean cost and benefit values were compared across the three
conditions (displayed in Table 4). Neither the monetary incentive nor health benefits conditions
differed significantly from the control in evaluations of cost, but a marginally significant
difference was observed between the monetary incentive and health benefits conditions (M=4.69
vs. M=5.38, p=0.075), suggesting that there is a cost-reducing nature to monetary incentive
programs. There were no significant differences observed amongst the three conditions for
valuations of the benefits of exercise, suggesting that educational interventions may not affect
individual perceptions of the benefits of exercise.
In addition to the general effect of the different conditions on valuations of costs and
benefits, the prime effect was also tested within smaller groups defined by age, sex, weight and
current exercise habits. Of note in these analyses are the following results. Infrequent exercisers,
defined as exercising less than or equal to two times per week, in the monetary incentive
condition perceive the cost to be significantly lower compared to participants in the control
condition (M=5.11 vs. M=6.42, p<0.05). Frequent exercisers, defined as those who exercise
more than two times per week, in the monetary incentive condition perceive the cost to be
marginally significantly lower compared to participants in the health benefits condition (M=4.42
vs. M=5.38, p=0.056). Older adults, greater than 25 years of age, in the monetary incentive
condition also perceive cost to be marginally significantly less than those primed with health
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benefits (M=4.85 vs. M=5.88, p=0.091). Finally, participants that consider themselves to be
overweight or obese evaluate the value of exercise to be marginally significantly less in the
incentive condition compared to those in the control condition (M=7.50 vs. M=8.38, p=0.073).
No effects were observed within young adults (less than or equal to 25 years of age) or those
who consider themselves to be underweight or of normal weight.
A final set of exploratory analyses was conducted to see if valuations of the costs and
benefits of exercise vary by groups, independent of condition. These analyses revealed that
females value the benefit of exercise to be significantly higher than males (M=7.77 vs. M=6.98,
p=0.013). As one might expect, frequent exercisers also perceive the cost of exercise to be
significantly lower compared to less-frequent exercisers (M=4.63 vs. M=5.52, p<0.01). No
difference was observed in these participants’ perception of the benefits of exercise. Participants
who consider themselves to be normal or underweight perceive the cost to be significantly higher
than participants who consider themselves overweight or obese (M=5.11 vs. M=4.41, p=0.05).
No differences emerged between ages or by student or employment status. While these results
are suggestive, it is important to note that because no corrections were performed for the
experiment-wise alpha, the results from the reported t-tests may be affected. Future research
should correct for the large number of comparisons to ascertain the true relationships.
3. Implications
The results from this study have substantial implications for current fitness incentive or
subsidy programs. The difference in cost perceptions observed across all participants between
those in the incentive condition versus those in the health benefits conditions suggests that
incentives do operate, to some extent, to reduce perceived cost and are likely to lead to changes
in behavior. Furthermore, the differential effect of the different primes by groups suggest that to
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achieve optimal results, incentive programs should potentially vary by groups. Current exercise
habits predict different responses to the subsidies as well as age and weight status. The
exploratory analyses by the smaller groups also suggest that current subsidy programs should be
more tailored to individual characteristics. Perhaps females and those who already exercise
frequently should be subsidized less and individuals with different weight statuses should receive
different subsidies. As previously mentioned, however, there are concerns of fairness, therefore it
may be moral to avoid essentially price-discriminating by arbitrary characteristics (sex and age)
and focus exclusively on those that the individual can control or influence more easily (current
habits and weight). While the hypothetical nature of the study is limiting, these results show that
there is variation both across different groupings of individuals and in responsiveness to the three
conditions. Future research is necessary and would be beneficial to provide greater insight as to
how incentive schemes can be designed to achieve the best outcomes. An analogous system is
auto-insurance companies using monitors in members’ cars that track driving behavior, which in
turn, affects the rates charged to the member.
VII. Conclusion
This paper sought to model the individual choice to exercise and the health insurance
company’s subsidy for the behavior, as well as provide insight as to the optimal subsidy for such
behavior. A traditional principal-agent framework is necessary and useful in understanding the
problem: including both models for each decision maker’s choice – the health insurance
company choosing to set their amount of reimbursement and the individual choosing to exercise
given that effective subsidy. A traditional economic approach, however, is not sufficient for this
goal and is not able to fully explain or capture the essence of the problem. The phenomenon of
hyperbolic discounting from the field of behavioral economics as well as insights from

30	
  

psychology facilitate a deeper, more realistic understanding of the problem and therefore allow
us to better design solutions. The empirical evidence provided further shows the need for careful
design of programs that target individual characteristics rather than the insured population as a
whole. It is only once we understand the root of a problem that we can effectively respond and
find a solution. In the case of exercise and physical activity, the immense physiological and
mental benefits can and hopefully will lead to not only lower costs but a generally happier,
healthier population.
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Tables & Figures
Figure 1: US National Health Expenditures 2000-2009
Source: https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/
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Figure 2: Age-adjusted Prevalence of Overweight, Obesity, and Extreme Obesity among US
Adults aged 20 and over
Source: http://www.cdc.gov/NCHS/data/hestat/obesity_adult_07_08/obesity_adult_07_08.pdf
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Figure 3: Exponential vs. Hyperbolic Discounting
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Table 1: Top 10 Health Insurance Companies (as ranked by US News and World Report)
Source: http://health.usnews.com/health-plans/national-insurance-companies
Name
Unitedhealth Group
Wellpoint Inc. Group
Kaiser Foundation Group
Aetna Group
Humana Group
HCSC Group
Coventry Corp. Group
Highmark Group
Independence Blue Cross Group

Size
75 million
66 million
8 million
41 million
12 million
13 million
5 million
5 million
3 million

Type of Fitness Incentive
D, W
D, W
D
D, P
P
D
D, P
D
D

D=Discounted gym memberships
W=worksite options
P=wellness/education programs
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Table 2: First Order Conditions without Discounting Behavior
Equations (3.5) from the Consumer’s Decision

€
€

€

dΦ dU dU dH1 dU dH 2
=
+
⋅
+
⋅
− λ ⋅ PX 1 = 0
dX1 dX1 dH1 dX1 dH 2 dX1

(3.5a)

dΦ dU dU dH 2
=
+
⋅
− λ ⋅ PX 2 = 0
dX 2 dX 2 dH 2 dX 2

(3.5b)

dΦ dU dH1 dm1
dU dH 2 dm1 dH 2 dm2 dm1
=
(
⋅
)+
(
⋅
+
⋅
⋅
) − λ ⋅ (1 − K1 )⋅ PF1 = 0
dF1 dH1 dm1 dF1 dH 2 dm1 dF1 dm2 dm1 dF1

(3.5c)

dΦ dU dH 2 dm2
=
(
⋅
) − λ ⋅ (1 − K 2 )⋅ PF2 = 0
dF2 dH 2 dm2 dF2

(3.5d)

dΦ
= I − ((1 − K1)⋅ PF1 ⋅ F1 ) + ((1 − K 2 )⋅ PF2 ⋅ F2 ) + (PX 1 ⋅ X1) + (PX 2 ⋅ X 2 ) = 0
dλ

(3.5e)

€
€

Table 3: Simplified First-Order Conditions without Discounting Behavior
Equations (3.6) from the Consumer’s Decision
MU X 1 = λ ⋅ PX 1

(3.6a)

MU X 2 = λ ⋅ PX 2

(3.6b)

€

MU F1 = λ ⋅ (1 − K1)⋅ PF1

(3.6c)

€

MU F2 = λ ⋅ (1 − K 2 )⋅ PF2

(3.6d)

€

I = ((1 − K1)⋅ PF1 ⋅ F1 ) + ((1 − K 2 )⋅ PF2 ⋅ F2 ) + (PX 1 ⋅ X1) + (PX 2 ⋅ X 2 )

(3.6e)

€
€

Table 4: Mean Cost & Benefit Values by Prime
Fitness Incentive

Cost (b1)
4.69*

Benefit (b2)
7.29

Health Benefits
Control

5.38*
4.87

7.79
7.74

Total
4.94
7.56
Note: * indicates marginally significant difference
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Appendix
Health Benefits Prime
Please read the following excerpt on the benefits of regular physical activity.
(Source: Mayo Clinic)
Want to feel better, have more energy and perhaps even live longer? The benefits of exercise are
yours for the taking, regardless of your age, sex or physical ability.
No. 1: Exercise controls weight
Exercise can help prevent excess weight gain or help maintain weight loss. When you engage in
physical activity, you burn calories. The more intense the activity, the more calories you burn.
No. 2: Exercise combats health conditions and diseases
Being active boosts high-density lipoprotein (HDL), or 'good,' cholesterol and decreases
unhealthy triglycerides. This one-two punch keeps your blood flowing smoothly, which
decreases your risk of cardiovascular diseases. Regular physical activity can also help prevent or
manage stroke, metabolic syndrome, type 2 diabetes, depression, certain types of cancer, arthritis
and falls.
No. 3: Exercise improves mood
Physical activity stimulates various brain chemicals that may leave you feeling happier and more
relaxed. Exercising regularly can also boost your confidence and improve your self-esteem.
No. 4: Exercise boosts energy
Regular physical activity can improve your muscle strength and boost your endurance.
No. 5: Exercise promotes better sleep
Regular physical activity can help you fall asleep faster and deepen your sleep.
No. 6: Exercise puts the spark back into your sex life
Regular physical activity can lead to enhanced arousal for women. And men who exercise
regularly are less likely to have problems with erectile dysfunction than are men who don't
exercise.
No. 7: Exercise can be fun
It gives you a chance to unwind, enjoy the outdoors or simply engage in activities that make you
happy alone or with others.
Neutral Prime
The Affordable Care Act, a bill recently passed by the Obama Administration, puts individuals,
families and small business owners in control of their health care. It reduces premium costs for
millions of working families and small businesses by providing hundreds of billions of dollars in
tax relief – the largest middle class tax cut for health care in history.
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